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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS 
Forced to Live in the Employer’s House:  
A Comparative Study of Migrant Domestic Workers in Hong Kong and Singapore 
 
by 
 
Kanako Masuda 
Master of Urban and Regional Planning 
University of California, Los Angeles, 2019 
Professor Paavo Monkkonen, Chair 
 
In Hong Kong there are currently about 380 thousand migrant domestic workers (Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) Immigration Department, 2018) and in Singapore there 
are currently about 260 thousand (Singapore Ministry of Manpower, 2018). They often suffer 
abuse. Many experts believe that the live-in rule, which in both cities requires them to live in 
their employer’s home, is one of the factors that contribute to the abuse of these workers. 
Through interviews with key advocates of migrant domestic workers and comparing Hong Kong 
and Singapore, this thesis explores the different interests that various actors attach to advocacy 
for domestic worker rights, using the live-in rule as a focal point. In Hong Kong, where migrant 
workers can organize and bring their own voices to advocacy, migrant domestic workers are 
vigorously acting to challenge structural oppression and discrimination. There are also abundant 
 iii 
local civil society actors that support and act in solidarity with migrant domestic workers. 
However, in Singapore, where migrant workers cannot join public protests, migrant domestic 
workers are absent from campaigns that aim to benefit these workers. The findings indicate 
that in Hong Kong, the live-in rule is understood as a regulation that fosters discrimination and 
strengthens systematic oppression against migrant domestic workers. On the contrary, in 
Singapore, migrant domestic workers cannot join public protest, and therefore, the live-in rule is 
understood primarily as an issue of space and cost and does not get much attention from the 
key actors. 
  
 iv 
This thesis of Kanako Masuda is approved. 
Christopher C Tilly 
Karen N Umemoto 
Amada Armenta 
Paavo Monkkonen, Committee Chair 
 
University of California, Los Angeles 
2019 
 
  
 v 
Table of contents 
1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 1 
2. Background ......................................................................................................................... 6 
Current Political Climate ................................................................................................................... 6 
Hong Kong ............................................................................................................................................................ 6 
Singapore ............................................................................................................................................................. 7 
History of Migrant Domestic Worker Program .................................................................................. 7 
Hong Kong ............................................................................................................................................................ 7 
Singapore .............................................................................................................................................................. 9 
Current Migrant Domestic Worker Program .................................................................................... 13 
General Regulations ............................................................................................................................................ 13 
Accommodation and Food Provisions in Hong Kong .......................................................................................... 15 
Accommodation and Food Provisions in Singapore ............................................................................................ 16 
International Standards for Domestic Workers ................................................................................................. 18 
3. Literature Review .............................................................................................................. 20 
The Global Care Deficit .................................................................................................................... 20 
Migration Governance .................................................................................................................... 21 
Civil Society and Migrant Domestic Worker Activism ....................................................................... 23 
Hong Kong .......................................................................................................................................................... 23 
Singapore ........................................................................................................................................................... 26 
4. Concept Model .................................................................................................................. 28 
Interest Convergence ...................................................................................................................... 28 
5. Methods ............................................................................................................................ 31 
6. Analysis ............................................................................................................................. 33 
Why demand migrant domestic workers to live-in? ......................................................................... 33 
Hong Kong .......................................................................................................................................................... 33 
Singapore ........................................................................................................................................................... 39 
What is the problem with the live-in rule? ...................................................................................... 40 
Hong Kong .......................................................................................................................................................... 40 
Singapore ........................................................................................................................................................... 42 
Why do different actors want to change the live-in rule? ................................................................ 43 
Hong Kong .......................................................................................................................................................... 43 
Singapore ........................................................................................................................................................... 52 
7. Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 57 
Appendix ............................................................................................................................... 60 
References ............................................................................................................................ 62 
 vi 
List of Figures 
Figure 1. Number of Foreign Domestic Helpers by Nationality (Hong Kong)  .....  10 
Figure 2. Population by Residential Status (Singapore)     …..  13 
Figure 3. Old-age Support Ratio (Hong Kong and Singapore, 1990-2017)  …..  13 
Figure 4. Total Fertility Rate (1981-2017)      …..  61 
Figure 5. Female Labour Participation Rate (age 25-64)    ….. 61 
 
  
 vii 
List of Tables 
Table 1. Eligibility Criteria and Requirements for Migrant Domestic Workers ….. 15 
Table 2. Eligibility Criteria and Requirements for Employers of  
Migrant Domestic Workers ….. 16 
Table 3. Basic information of the two cities     ….. 62 
   
 1 
1. Introduction 
Both Hong Kong and Singapore rely heavily on migrant domestic workers. In part, this allows 
them to maintain their profile as a “first world” city. According to the immigration department 
of Hong Kong, one in seven households have a foreign domestic worker at their house (HKSAR 
Census and Statistics Department, 2018). In Singapore, the number is about one in five 
households (Singapore Department of Statistics,2019 and Ministry of Manpower, 2019). Hence, 
migrant domestic workers are the backbone of the society that enable many of their productive 
age population to participate in the paid workforce. 
However, stories of “maid abuse” have been told repeatedly in Hong Kong and 
Singapore. For example, in 1995, Flor Contemplacion—a Filipina domestic worker based in 
Singapore—was accused of killing her employer's son and her colleague domestic worker. 
Despite the contradictory evidence in the case, the Singaporean court sentenced her to death. 
This unfair treatment, coupled with the reluctance of Philippine government to save her, led to 
a national rally in the Philippines and among overseas Filipino communities, demanding the fair 
treatment of migrant workers. This, and many other cases of migrant worker abuse, have 
heightened the need for a strong transnational network to protect the migrant community. 
In 2014, Erwiana Sulistyaningsih—an Indonesian maid in Hong Kong—was found in Hong 
Kong International airport, unable to walk after eight months of violence and the continuous 
denial of medical treatment. She had been severely abused by her employer, was threatened 
not to tell anybody what had happened and was abandoned at the airport. Her case makes us 
ask, to what extent have the protections for migrant domestic workers advanced after decades 
of struggle? What is still missing? 
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Migrant domestic workers, the subject of this study, are in a structurally precarious 
position. First, being a migrant often entails that the local government is not primarily 
responsible for the one’s welfare. The government prioritizes the needs of the employer, who is 
a citizen, and considers the needs of the employee, who is a foreign non-citizen, as secondary. 
Also, since the workplace of domestic work is inside a private home, it is hidden from public 
scrutiny. The condition of work, therefore, often relies on the employer's good will. 
Furthermore, there is often stigma attached to foreign domestic workers that marginalizes them 
as “other,” and perpetuates discriminatory treatment from society. This happens no matter 
what social class one is from, evident because some domestic workers, especially Filipina 
workers, are well educated and have had managerial or professional jobs in their country. Once 
they become a domestic worker, however, they are treated as a “servant.” This treatment is not 
only from employers but from many authorities—be it immigration officers, officials of her own 
embassy, employment agencies and staff at judicial procedure (Constable, 2014).  
The focus of this thesis is the live-in rule that mandates migrant domestic workers reside 
in their employers’ homes. They are expected to be able to serve a single employer 24 hours a 
day, seven days a week.  The live-in rule not only blurs the line between work and personal life, 
but also entails various other problems, such as inadequate accommodation, insufficient food, 
lack of privacy and no security. For example, according to a report from Mission for Migrant 
workers (2013) on the live-in rule in Hong Kong, 30 per cent of 3000 respondents had no private 
room and were made to stay with other family members, including adult males, or sleep in the 
living room, kitchen, corridor, bathroom or store room. More than 37 per cent of the 
respondents reported that they had to work more than 16 hours a day. Similarly, in Singapore, 
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NGOs cite the live-in rule as the main factor for long working hours, isolating workers from 
outside help and making them prone to physical and sexual abuse (HOME, 2015). 
Since the live-in rule creates abusive working condition in many ways, there have been 
multiple efforts to change the mandatory live-in rule; especially active in Hong Kong. There have 
been a few sporadic attempts in Singapore, as documented by Lyons (2005), as well as in the 
sending countries.  
In 2016, a Filipino domestic worker in Hong Kong started a legal challenge to question 
the constitutionality of the coercive live-in regulation. In 2018, the judge wrote in his judgement 
that the worker can terminate the employment if she finds it unacceptable and thus, it is lawful 
(Hong Kong Court of First Instance, 2018). The plaintiff team plan to appeal to the Court of 
Appeal (email with the lawyer of plaintiff, 3/25/2019). 
Using the mandatory live-in rule as a focal point, I aim to understand how the workers, 
rights organizations, employment agencies and states interpret the live-in regulation, how and 
why these groups are alternately working to abolish or maintain the rule. Thus, this research will 
answer the following questions:  
1) What is the purpose of live-in rule? Why do some people think the rule is necessary? 
2) What problems does the live-in rule create? Why do so many people think forcing the 
employees to stay at their employers’ house is a problem? 
3) Why have different actors acted to reverse the live-in rule? How does this action match 
with their own interests? 
I borrow from the concept of “interest convergence” (Bell, 1980) to analyze why 
different actors have tried to change the live-in rule. For the purpose of this research, I expand 
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the meaning of interest convergence and define it as: the interest of marginalized groups in 
achieving equality will only be accommodated when it converges with the interests of dominant 
groups. I will analyze nine interviews I conducted during January to March of 2019 and 
documents related to the live-in rule, published by the government and NGOs, to see how 
different actors reframe their objective in a way that converges with or diverges from the 
interests of the dominant group. 
I collected primary data through semi-structured interviews with nine key organization 
leaders and members in Hong Kong and Singapore during January to March 2019. I followed up 
on these interviews through text message and email, as well as with government agencies. I 
then compared the answers to similar questions across different actors to see how each actor 
framed the issue and how that was compatible with their own interests.  
The chief findings from this analysis are that in Hong Kong, the live-in rule is understood 
as a discriminatory regulation that isolates the domestic workers from other domestic workers 
as well as the Hong Kong society at large. Conversely, in Singapore, the live-in rule is understood 
as an issue of space and cost. Therefore, the discussion in Hong Kong centered around the 
consequences of live-in rule and the validity of the causal relationship between maltreatment of 
domestic workers and the live-in rule. The discussion in Singapore is centered around the 
question of how an employer will accommodate foreign domestic workers or what the policy 
recommendation would be.   
Each group strategically reframes their motivations so that they resonates with the 
dominant groups’ interests. These coalitions must be rigorously maintained as migrant workers’ 
voice can easily be ignored when it does not fit in the diminant groups’ agenda. Moreover, in 
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the limited democracy of both Hong Kong and Singapore, there is no direct link between 
advocacy work and policy change. 
The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows. I first provide background about the 
migrant domestic worker system in Hong Kong and Singapore, its history and how it has 
changed. Then I review the literature on the effects of the live-in rule on different actors and 
their reactions to it. After the literature review, I outline my methods and analysis, and conclude 
by arguing that although the live-in rule clearly makes the migrant domestic workers vulnerable, 
the varying recognition of its importance has made advocacy work in the two cities differ 
greatly.   
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2. Background 
This research focuses on migrant domestic workers in two destination countries, Hong Kong and 
Singapore. Both Hong Kong and Singapore hire a large number of migrant domestic workers and 
in Hong Kong, Indonesians and Filipinas together consist 98 percent of the migrant domestic 
workers (HKSAR Census and Statistics Department, 2018). Although there are no official figures 
for the nationality component of migrant domestic workers in Singapore, advocates say that 
Indonesians and Filipinas are the dominant nationalities (TWC2, 2011). One of the main 
differences between Hong Kong and Singapore is the way their governments manage migration. 
In Singapore, there are more stringent regulations governing migrant domestic workers and in 
addition, employers are made responsible for any violations of the immigration rule via security 
deposit. In Hong Kong, there are no security deposits and thus the force from the government is 
much smaller. Nevertheless, employers in Hong Kong also try to control the worker in order to 
avoid losing the money they have invested to employ a migrant domestic worker (Backchat, 
2/15/2019). 
 
Current Political Climate 
Hong Kong 
Although the Basic Law—Hong Kong’s mini constitution—states that the existing capitalist 
system will be maintained for at least 50 years after the handover from the United Kingdom to 
China , a ‘high degree of autonomy’ will be given and universal suffrage in choosing the city’s 
chief executive will be gradually implemented, those promises are in crisis. In 2015, several 
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owners and stakeholders of bookstores that sold books criticizing the Chinese Communist Party 
went missing for a few months. It seems that they were detained and threatened by the 
Chinese authority, yet most of them did not say what happened to them and one of them only 
said that he will close his bookstore (Ikegami, 2016). Many people believed there is freedom of 
expression in Hong Kong, however this incident shows this may not be the case anymore. In 
June 2019, a new extradition law threatened the rule of law in Hong Kong more broadly 
 
Singapore 
The government of Singapore has been successful in its nation building by focusing all its 
resources on economic development and managing its people through strong leadership. 
Freedom and individual rights were seen as sources of instability and an obstacle to economic 
development. The education system was structured to collect the “best” people to the 
government, and the rest was expected to obey. Most Singaporeans followed the rule because 
they valued the stability and prosperity the government brought. However, this is starting to 
change. As the share of citizens born locally has risen from 56% in 1947 to 82% in 2000 (Iwasaki, 
2013), they are feeling more attached to the place and entitled to claim rights as Singaporeans. 
 
History of Migrant Domestic Worker Program 
Hong Kong 
Hong Kong has had many forms of domestic workers throughout its history. In 1842, Hong Kong 
became a British colony as a result of first Opium War. At that time, the residents, including 
their domestic workers were almost entirely male (Sankar, 1978). In the early 20th century, as 
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sanitary and housing conditions improved, women and children started to move in. The wives 
and mothers preferred female domestic workers, so that muijai (girls under ten years old, sold 
into servitude) and later sohei (“sworn spinster” amahs from Guangdong Delta) became popular 
among Hong Kong households (Constable, 1997).  
During the political turmoil of early and mid-20th century on the mainland, the economy 
of Hong Kong grew, absorbing immigrants and refugees from mainland China. In the 1970s, 
many factories moved over the strait to the mainland and Hong Kong’s industry shifted from 
manufacturing to the service sector (Kurata and Zhang, 2015). The service sector employed 
more educated, middle-class women, so demand for domestic help rose. However, since local 
women preferred factory work to domestic work, amahs (Chinese live-in domestic workers) 
became scarce, and moreover, people thought the remaining amahs were “not as good as they 
use to be” (Constable, 1997). This was when the Hong Kong government launched its foreign 
domestic workers program, in 1973. It was primarily the western expatriates that hired Filipina 
domestic workers at first. However, it soon became popular among local Chinese employers, 
who could speak some English, to employ Filipina domestic workers for their household help 
(ibid).  
In the 1980s, as the population of Filipina domestic workers grew, hostility towards 
domestic workers increased. Employers openly expressed concerns about their assertiveness 
and employment agencies sought for more docile alternatives (Constable, 2007). As a result, the 
number of Indonesian domestic workers grew rapidly, since the late 1990s (see figure 1). As of 
2017, there are 370,000 migrant domestic workers and among them there are 200,000 Filipinas, 
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160,000 Indonesians, 4,000 Indians, 2,000 Thais and several other nationalities (HKSAR Census 
and Statistics Department, 2018). Figure 1 shows this changing set of nationalities. 
 
note: The total population of Hong Kong is 7.4 million (as of 2017). It has been growing slowly at the average 
annual rate below one percent (1997-2017). 
(Source: Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Hong Kong Annual Digest of 
Statistics 1995-2018 available at: https://www.censtatd.gov.hk/hkstat/sub/sp140.jsp?productCode=B1010003) 
 
Singapore 
When the British rented Singapore from Johor Sultanate in 1819, there were only 150 people 
living on the island. However, Singapore had a geographical advantage; it is located on the 
Southern side of Malacca Strait, where almost all vessels that trade between Asia and Europe 
pass. Singapore prospered as a trading port and in addition to British, Dutch and Portuguese, 
many Chinese merchants1 and workers migrated to the city (Iwasaki, 2013). 
                                                        
1 Some people with Chinese descent living in Southeast Asia call themselves Peranakan, which 
literally means a local born person (Ota, 2018).  
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Until the 1930s, the average Chinese households that migrated to Singapore brought 
muijai--young girls in unpaid domestic servitude—with them.  European and wealthy local 
households hired “cookboys” and “houseboys” who paid male domestic servants (Wong, 1996). 
In the 1930s, muijai trade got more regulated and male migration got more regulated. 
Consequently, women migrants started to entry into paid domestic service. Many of them were 
amahs from Kwangtung province in China, stereotypically known as strong-minded, single 
young women who often had joined the anti-marriage resistance movement (i.e., resisting 
marriage as another form of domestic servitude) and migrated to pursue their own preferred 
way of life. Amahs were considered as live-in professional domestic workers, and they earned 
high salary comparable to that of English-speaking clerks (ibid). 
In the 1950s and 1960s, amahs were dwindling in number and the remaining ones were 
highly respected by European and wealthy local households. But still, local middle-class 
households could easily employ domestic help from rural and urban poor, where population 
was rapidly growing, and unemployment rate was high.  
The availability of local domestic labor changed as the nation began a major political and 
economic transformation. In 1963, Singapore regained sovereignty from British colonial regime 
by joining Malaysia. However, after two years, Singapore was expelled from Malaysia; they 
could not get along with the Malaysian government’s preferential treatment of Malay people 
(Iwasaki, 2013). 
Starting from the late 1960s, the country also transformed its economy through export-
oriented industrialization, absorbing young women from orphanages and social welfare homes, 
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into employment. By the end of 1970s, middle-class households could no longer find domestic 
worker from traditional sources of urban and rural poor (Wong, 1996). 
In 1978, Singapore introduced Foreign Maids Scheme. The policy was set to encourage 
female labour participation rate and ameliorate the nation’s severe labour shortage (Wong, 
1996). Although there were already foreign domestic workers who had entered Singapore with 
their expatriate employers or through individual personal contacts, this was when professional 
recruitment agencies started to operate under Employment Agency Act. In 1986, new guidelines 
were issued for foreign domestic workers; the guidelines introduced many of the core 
regulations that still exist today, such as, levy on the employer of a domestic worker, SGD 5000 
security bond imposed on employers, six-monthly mandatory pregnancy tests for foreign 
domestic workers and prohibition of marriage to a Singaporean (ibid). However, it is notable 
that security bond is not required for Malaysian domestic workers (Ministry of Manpower, n.d.) 
as they are considered as “traditional” source. 
As of 2018, the population of Singapore is over five million, while citizens are three 
million, permanent residents are half million, and the rest are classified as non-residents (i.e., 
foreigners with a work permit, professional pass, dependent pass, student pass, long stay 
permit, etc.) (Singapore Department of Statistics, 2019; see also figure 2). Rapid aging (see 
figure 3) and low reproduction rate (see Appendix figure 4) is one of the major concerns of the 
Singaporean government. The government is tackling this with basically three tactics: 1) 
encourage couples to have more babies, 2) opening up to immigration and 3) calling for 
overseas Singaporeans to return home (Rahman and Kiong, 2013).  
 12 
 
note: Statistics for foreign domestic workers were only available for the most recent five years. Nationality 
breakdown was not available. 
(Source: Singapore Department of Statistics. 2019. Population and Population Structure. available at: 
https://www.singstat.gov.sg/find-data/search-by-theme/population/population-and-population-structure/latest-
data and Singapore Ministry of Manpower. 2019. “Foreign workforce numbers.” available at: 
https://www.mom.gov.sg/documents-and-publications/foreign-workforce-numbers) 
 
 
*note:  Old-age Support Ratio is the number of residents aged 20-64 years per resident aged 65 years & over (per 
resident aged 65 years & over). 
(Source: Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Hong Kong Annual Digest of 
Statistics 1995-2018 available at: https://www.censtatd.gov.hk/hkstat/sub/sp140.jsp?productCode=B1010003 and 
Singapore Department Of Statistics. 2019. Population and Population Structure. available at: 
https://www.singstat.gov.sg/find-data/search-by-theme/population/population-and-population-structure/latest-
data) 
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One of Singapore’s important markers of national identity is meritocracy (Koh, 2005).  As 
a city nation without any natural resources, the political leaders envisioned that survival of 
Singapore lies solely in economic development. Therefore, the state stoically pursued economic 
growth, and everything was categorized along its economic utility. Immigration was no 
exception to this rule. All foreigners were categorized by the economic value s/he can bring, and 
highly valued people were given subsidies, such as access to public housing and was encouraged 
to apply for permanent residency. Migrants of “low” value, such as construction workers and 
domestic workers, are kept under strict control of the employers; the employers must pay 
security deposit to the government to employ low skilled migrant workers, which will be taken 
away if the worker runs away or commits criminal activity. They are kept transient and cannot 
apply for permanent residency. 
 
Current Migrant Domestic Worker Program 
General Regulations 
Hong Kong and Singapore have similar formal migrant domestic worker programs, which is 
basically a guest worker program, where the worker’s stay is tied to the employment contract. 
Both countries require migrant domestic workers to live-in their employers’ homes, and neither 
have work hour regulations. However, there are notable differences. First, in Singapore,   six-
monthly pregnancy test is required, and they are prohibited from giving birth in Singapore. In 
Hong Kong, pregnancy test is not required and migrant domestic workers are entitled to 
maternity leave. Second, in Singapore employers must buy 5,000 SGD of security bond to have a 
work permit issued and pay monthly levy throughout the workers’ contract period. In Hong 
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Kong, employers do not have to buy security bond nor pay levy. Third, migrant domestic 
workers are covered under the same labour law as the locals in Hong Kong, and therefore 
entitled to various workers’ rights such as, weekly day-off, statutory holidays and maternity 
leave, which are not guaranteed in Singapore. Fourth, in Hong Kong migrant workers also have 
the freedom of association and right to collective bargaining, whereas, in Singapore even 
citizens have limited rights to collective bargaining and forming associations. Thus, Singapore 
has more stringent policies that govern migrant domestic workers, nevertheless, in both Hong 
Kong and Singapore, migrant domestic workers share common experiences of abusive working 
conditions. 
Table 1 and 2 summarizes the eligibility criteria and requirements for the employees and 
employers of migrant domestic worker. 
Table 1. Eligibility Criteria and Requirements for Migrant Domestic Workers 
 Hong Kong Singapore 
Age (no age requirement) Between 23 to 50 years old 
Gender (no gender requirement) Female 
nationality Nationals of Afghanistan, Cuba, 
Laos, North Korea, Nepal and 
Vietnam are not permitted. 
Only nationals of Indonesia, 
Philippines, Myanmar, Sri Lanka 
and a few others are permitted. 
Education (no education requirement) Workers must have at least eight 
years of formal education. 
Live-in 
requirement 
Employee must live-in at 
employer’s home. 
Employee must live-in at 
employer’s home. 
Pregnancy test (no pregnancy test required.) 
If worker becomes pregnant, she is 
entitled to paid maternity leave. 
Pregnancy test required every six 
months. If worker becomes 
pregnant, she must leave the 
country or have an abortion. 
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Table 2. Eligibility Criteria and Requirements for Employers of Migrant Domestic Workers 
 Hong Kong Singapore 
Age (no age requirement) 21 years old or older 
Income Employer must have household 
income of HKD15000 (about 1900 
USD) per month or higher per one 
domestic worker. 
(no income requirement) 
Government  
Security Bond/Levy 
(no security bond or levy) Employer must pay SGD 5000 
(about 3600 USD) as security bond. 
(unless the worker is Malaysian) 
Employer must pay SGD 300 per 
month (first FDW, without 
concession) as levy. 
Labour Law Same law for everybody, including 
migrant domestic workers. (i.e., 
Employment Ordinance) 
Different law for foreigners. (i.e., 
Employment of Foreign Manpower 
Act) 
Other Employer must enter into standard 
Employment Contract with the 
worker. 
 
 
 
First time employer of foreign 
domestic worker should take 
Employers’ Orientation Programme 
(3 hours). 
Employer must obtain medical and 
personal accident insurance for the 
worker. 
note: Both Tables 1 and 2 are as of May 1, 2019. 
(Source: Singapore Ministry of Manpower website: https://www.mom.gov.sg/, HKSAR Immigration Department 
website: https://www.immd.gov.hk/ (Tables 1 and 2)) 
 
Accommodation and Food Provisions in Hong Kong 
According to “Guidebook for the Employment of Domestic Helpers from Abroad” issued by 
the Immigration Department, HKSAR: 
The Helper shall be provided with suitable accommodation and with reasonable privacy*. 
*Examples of unsuitable accommodation are: the Helper having to sleep on made-do beds in the 
corridor with little privacy or sharing a room with an adult or teenager of the opposite sex. 
(Immigration Department, HKSAR. 2017: p.1) 
Food must be provided free of charge or if not, food allowance must be paid: 
IX. Standard Employment Contract and Terms of Employment for Helpers 
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… 
Food allowance (if no food is provided to the Helper) 
39. Clause 5(b): The agreed amount of food allowance should not be less than the applicable food 
allowance announced by the HKSAR Government2. 
(Immigration Department, HKSAR. 2017: p.10) 
As such, these guidance about accommodation and food are conceptual and lack tangible 
criteria. For example, there is no clear definition of “suitable” accommodation or “reasonable” 
privacy. 
 
Accommodation and Food Provisions in Singapore 
According to Singapore Ministry of Manpower’s website, under ‘rest days and well-being for 
foreign domestic workers,’ conditions of accommodation and food is instructed as follows: 
Accommodation 
You must ensure that your FDW3's accommodation meets the following requirements: 
• Adequate shelter: the accommodation must adequately protect your FDW from environmental 
elements such as sun, rain or strong winds.  
• Basic amenities: you must minimally provide your FDW with a mattress, pillow, blanket, 
bathroom amenities and toiletries. Examples of toiletries include soap, shampoo, toothbrush, 
toothpaste, etc. 
• Sufficient ventilation: your FDW’s accommodation must be sufficiently ventilated. Mechanical 
ventilation (e.g. electrical fan) must be provided if natural ventilation is inadequate. 
                                                        
2 Food allowance is set at 1,075 HKD (about 140 USD) per month (as of June 2019).  
 
3 FDW is an abbreviation of Foreign Domestic Worker. This footnote was added by author. 
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• Safety: your FDW must not sleep near any dangerous equipment or structure that could 
potentially cause harm or hurt to her. 
• Modesty: your FDW must not sleep in the same room as a male adult or teenager. If you install 
video recording devices at home, you must inform your FDW of the devices and where they are 
placed. You must not install them in areas that will compromise her privacy or modesty, e.g. 
where she sleeps, change clothes, or the bathroom area. 
• Space and privacy: you should provide your FDW with a separate room. If that is not possible, 
you must ensure that her accommodation has adequate space and privacy. 
Adequate food 
You must provide your FDW with 3 meals a day. 
An example of a day’s food intake for a female engaged in moderate activity is as follows: 
• Breakfast: 4 slices of bread with spread. 
• Lunch: 1 bowl of rice + three-quarter cup of cooked vegetables + palm-sized amount of meat 
(fish/poultry/beef/lamb) + fruit 
• Dinner: 1 bowl of rice + three-quarter cup of cooked vegetables + palm-sized amount of meat 
(fish/poultry/beef/lamb) + fruit 
Be sensitive to your FDW’s needs when it comes to food. Do not force your FDW to eat food that she is 
not supposed to or is not comfortable with. For example, your FDW may not be able to eat certain food 
due to her religious beliefs, or she may not be accustomed to your family’s dietary requirements (e.g. 
vegetarian food or porridge).(Ministry of Manpower, n.d. Bold in original.) 
Thus, both Hong Kong and Singapore have minimum standards for accommodation and 
food. However, the enforcement mechanism is virtually non-existent due to the government 
officials’ reluctance to inspect private households. 
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International Standards for Domestic Workers 
In 2011, the international collective movement towards promoting domestic migrants’ rights 
accrued as the adoption of International Labor Organization’s Domestic Workers Convention 
(C189). C189 is the first international standard specifically targeted to domestic workers, which 
requires states to ensure the same protection for domestic workers as other workers. Twenty-
five countries have ratified it before 2018. However, the Philippines is the only country in Asia 
that has ratified it (International Labor Organization, October 2018). 
The ILO Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 (No. 189) and the accompanying 
recommendation No. 201 require states to assure equal rights to domestic workers as applied 
to other workers. The main labor rights listed are, reasonable hours of work, fair payment, 
weekly rest, and freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining. (International 
Labor Organization, 2014) 
In the convention, there are several provisions related to live-in conditions and the most 
relevant ones are: 
Article 6. Each Member shall take measures to ensure that domestic workers, like workers generally, 
enjoy fair terms of employment as well as decent working conditions and, if they reside in the 
household, decent living conditions that respect their privacy 
and  
Article 9. Each Member shall take measures to ensure that domestic workers: 
(a) are free to reach agreement with their employer or potential employer on whether to 
reside in the household 
(International Labour Organization, 2011) 
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Therefore, according to international standard, live-in and live-out should be a mutual 
agreement between employer and employee (ILO C189 Article 9) and if the workers are to live-
in, they should be given a decent living condition with privacy (ILO C189 Article 6).  
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3. Literature Review 
Scholarly literature focusing on the live-in rule, especially from the migrant workers’ rights 
perspective is rare. Instead, the live-in rule is discussed indirectly as part of a larger system or as 
a condition for providing care to members of the host society. In this paper, I refer to three 
different streams of research that discusses the live-in rule or the live-in condition; the first is 
the perspective of host society’s needs for providing affordable and quality care, the second is 
the perspective of states and migration industries (i.e., the for-profit actors that facilitate or 
control migration) to regulate and manage the flow of migrant workers, and the third is the 
migrant domestic workers and their supporters’ perspective in promoting their rights.  
 
The Global Care Deficit 
The first discussions views live-in work from the employers’ side and explores how and why live-
in domestic work is needed, as well as why non-live-in domestic help is insufficient. In Hong 
Kong, this is understood in the context of child-care (for example, Patricia Cortes and Jessica Pan 
2013 and VCW Tam 2003), and in Singapore, it is discussed more in the context of elderly care 
(for example, Heng et al. 2019, Rozario et al. 2019 and Yeoh and Huang 2009). In both Hong 
Kong and Singapore, the need for extra care within a household is explained in relations to local 
women’s welfare and participation in the paid work force (ibid). 
This literature lies within the global trend of a “care crisis” (Parrenas, 2002), in which the 
women from poor countries migrate to fill the “care deficit” (ibid) of the rich countries, creating 
a “global care chain” (Hoschild, 2000 and 2003). Although some countries choose a more 
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institutionalized way, such as daycare facilities, to fill the care crisis, other countries choose 
home-based care, such as hiring a domestic worker. Ito (2014) compared 22 countries world-
wide and found that in places where familism (i.e., a society, which prioritizes familial 
obligations over individual rights) is strong, domestic workers are preferred over 
institutionalized care. 
 
Migration Governance 
The second discussion centers around the state’s immigration control. As Turner (2007) writes, 
each state has “contradiction between the economic need for labour mobility and the state’s 
political need to assert sovereignty.” Goh et al. (2017) further explain that for this reason, states 
are reluctant to give away their control over national borders to a “supranational authority” 
and, unlike flows of goods and capital, migration “lacks overarching multilateral regulatory 
framework.” Therefore, global migration regime is fragmented.  
Like many other countries around the globe, both Hong Kong and Singapore has a 
“bifurcated” (Wong 1997; Yeoh 2006) migration regime, where skilled migrants are entitled to 
various rights, such as bringing one’s family, changing jobs and choosing where to live,  while 
low-skilled migrants are often prohibited from any of those activities. Bélanger and Silvey (2019) 
relate this to the concept of “power geometries” (Massey, 1994), which focuses on the 
inequality of control over one’s mobility. Skilled migrants have more control over his/her 
mobility, be it the speed, the ability to reach desired destination, being with one’s family and 
avoiding the risk of deportation. Thus, those at the higher end of the migration hierarchy have 
more power over space. Furthermore, Bélanger and Silvey illustrate the rapid increase of low-
 22 
skilled workers on the move as “im/mobility turn;” the back slash meaning that the workers’ 
mobility is simultaneously making them immobile, trapping them in the stringent migration 
system, while they are on the move, during labour contract and after they return.  
Around the globe, the rapid increase of transnational movements has been associated 
with the development of a system and industry that manages and facilitates the move (Urry, 
2007). In the Asian low-skilled labour migration context, Xiang and Lindquist (2014) argue that 
the complex system and industry is consisting a “migration infrastructure,” which is a 
“systematically interlinked technologies, institutions, and actors that facilitate and condition 
mobility.” They further explain that the “migration infrastructure” has five logics of operation: 
1) for-profit recruitment intermediaries, 2) state regulations, 3) communication and 
transportation technologies, 4) humanitarian NGOs and international organizations and 5) social 
networks, such as migrants’ personal networks. When the migrants are in the destination 
country, the migration infrastructure “confines migrants to employers, prevents settlement, and 
enforces return.” 
Goh et al. (2017) examine the role of for-profit recruitment agencies in Singapore and 
argue that the for-profit agencies become political actors, filling the void of state inaction and 
interacting directly with the sending states’ governments. The Singapore government benefits 
from using the brokers as the mediator of migrants’ movement--threatening them with 
revocations of agency licenses. The state hides behind the ‘corporate veil,’ avoiding 
international criticism or diplomatic misstep with neighboring ASEAN countries. Consequently, 
the employment agencies associations have started to participate directly in global migration 
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governance, such as signing Memorandum of Understandings with sending states (Goh et al. 
2017 (with Indonesia); Marti 2019 (with the Philippines)). 
Similarly, Palmer (2013) studies the public-private partnership in the administration and 
control of migrant workers in Hong Kong. The Hong Kong government requires consular offices 
of the sending countries to endorse their citizens’ application to work as migrant domestic 
workers in Hong Kong. Through this policy, these consular offices develop public-private 
partnerships with local employment agencies and some of them enact regulatory function over 
Hong Kong-based employment agencies to protect their citizens. However, it is known that the 
employment agencies tend to side employers when conflict over employment occurs, therefore 
the force of these supra-territorial regulations of the sending countries is not strong. 
 
Civil Society and Migrant Domestic Worker Activism 
The third discussion is the view from migrant workers themselves and advocates who support 
them. The civil society in Hong Kong and Singapore has developed in very different ways. In 
Hong Kong, freedom of association and demonstration was promoted as part of British colonial 
strategies to democratize their colony at the end of their rule. In Singapore, civil society have 
historically been oppressed under development dictatorship and is still under strict control of 
the state.  
 
Hong Kong 
In Hong Kong, the civil society is active and migrant domestic workers are also their vocal 
component. As diverse actors voice their concerns and compete to be heard in the public 
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sphere, many scholars have focused on how different groups build coalition with each other. 
Constable (2009) analyzed “many states of protest” during the anti-World Trade Organization 
movement of 2005 and found how migrant domestic workers’ interests could resonate with the 
concerns of the Hong Kong local people. Especially, she points that as Hong Kong increasingly 
feel the pressure from mainland China on their self-rule, the privileged Hong Kong people and 
the migrant workers share common object of protecting right of assembly and freedom of 
expression.  
Lopez-Wui and Delias (2015) examine a similar phenomenon by looking at how Filipin 
migrant NGOs frame their issue. They point out the ways in which NGOs use different 
opportunities to promote their objectives while reframing their issues to be presented as 
relevant to each audiences and contexts. Lim (2016) adds an interesting view point to these 
coalition by focusing on solidarity building process across local and foreign domestic workers 
unions. Her findings indicate the fragility of these coalitions and how they are created through 
negotiation and struggle across the different groups. Additionally, she points that the unions 
build coalitions with each other in relation to both the global trends and local context. 
Global processes in the international arena, especially during the negotiations over 
International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention No. 189, “Decent Work for Domestic 
Workers,” in 2011, has attracted many scholarly attentions. Fish and Shumpert (2017)’s work 
have examined the ways domestic worker activists, NGOs and trade unions have worked 
together, and how the ILO negotiations had become a venue for building transnational ties with 
potential allies challenging similar issues in different countries.  
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Other than protesting in public, religious groups provide coping strategies to the migrant 
workers. While cautioning that these coping strategies do not challenge the structural injustice 
and even works to maintain the system, Nakonz and Shik (2009) nevertheless point to the 
positive mental effect these strategies have in alleviating the everyday aggression migrant 
domestic workers face. However, religious experiences have a big range of individual difference 
as reported in few researches (for example, Constable 2010). 
Culture also adds important nuance to the expression of migrant domestic workers’ 
activism in Hong Kong. Although often overlooked in public discourse, migrant workers come 
from a variety of backgrounds. Lai (2010) sheds light on this fact by focusing on the cultural 
performances shown as part of public protest by migrant domestic workers in Hong Kong.  
On the ground, there are many different organizations catered to specific interests of 
the members. The most vocal are the Filipino migrant organizations (for example, see Gibson, 
Law and McKay (2001)’s work on Asian Migrant Centre), and more recently, Indonesian 
migrants have become active  (for example, see Rother (2017)’s work on Association of 
Indonesian Migrant Workers (ATKI)). Filipino migrants have a long history of organizing and 
creating collective movement by using transnational diasporic ties. Indonesian and other 
nationalities’ migrant domestic workers were influenced by fellow Filipina domestic worker 
cohorts in Hong Kong. 
Hsia (2009) documents the making of transnational migrant movement through the 
development of Asian Migrants Coordinating Body (AMCB) in Hong Kong. AMCB is a coalition of 
grassroots migrant organizations across Asia. By grassroots, it means that member organizations 
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are primarily consisted of and ran by migrant workers themselves. These initiatives suggest 
Hong Kong’s unique position, among Asia, as a site where migrant worker activism prosper. 
 
Singapore 
Due to state regulations, Singapore’s civil society activities on migrant domestic worker 
advocacy is relatively new, and activism by migrant domestic workers themselves is still unseen. 
In Singapore, civil society organizations are supposed to operate within a space sanctioned by 
the state and the violation of those limits may result in arrests and closure of the organization. 
In 1987, 22 members of an NGO advocating for migrant workers’ rights were accused for 
“political agitation,” arrested and detained (Lyons, 2005). Since then, the Singapore civil society 
had omitted migrant workers from their scope of activities. However, since 1995, organizations 
offering support and advocacy reemerged, in response to the execution of Filipina domestic 
worker, Flor Contemplacion, which initiated a widespread movement among transnational 
Filipino communities (Piper, 2006). Lyons (2004 and 2005) also documents the early movements 
of migrant worker activism in Singapore; the inception of Transient Workers Count too (TWC2), 
which is one of the first organizations that deals explicitly with migrant workers’ issues. 
Since these reemergence of civil society activities in migrant workers’ issues, scholars 
have periodically documented and analyzed the development of advocacy work (for example, 
Yeoh and Annadhurai (2008) on the advocacy work of TWC2, AWARE and HOME and Lyons 
(2009) on TWC2 and HOME). One important “success” of the NGOs’ activities is the change in 
rest-day regulations for migrant domestic workers. In 2012, after a decade of vigorous 
campaigning, Singapore made it a requirement for employers to give their migrant domestic 
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workers weekly day-off or pay in lieu. This was a surprise for Singapore’s society and several 
researchers have analyzed this policy change (Koh et al. 2017a, 2017b and 2016; Palmary and de 
Gruchy 2016). Koh et al. (2017a) examine the ways advocates reframed migrant domestic 
workers’ rights claims so that it resonates with the Singapore society and the state’s core 
values. However, they cast doubt over the degree of “success” as the NGOs’ strategies “mirror 
and reinforce” the stereotypical image of victimized and docile women or see them merely as 
units of labour. 
The Singapore society is still cautious about the state’s intentions and NGOs’ activities. 
Yea (2018) inquired motivations of youth volunteers in human-trafficking and migrant rights 
organizations and found that those youth thought volunteering was “antithetical to career.” 
Many of them also concealed their experience from their families because their family would be 
anxious that the state may think they are “revolting against government.” 
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4. Concept Model 
Interest Convergence 
Interest convergence was introduced by Derick Bell in 1980 as a principle that explains why the 
struggles of blacks in the United States (U.S.) sometimes see “success” while at other times they 
do not. Since then, the interest convergence principle has been used widely in U.S. legal 
academics, such as in criminal law, employment discrimination law and American Indian law 
(Driver, 2011). The principle has also provided a strategic method for producing wide range of 
social change in the US, for example promoting educational reform, illuminating animal rights or 
seeking remedy for concentrated poverty (ibid).   
Although going over this wide range of literature is out of the scope of this thesis, I 
consider it necessary to go over Bell (1980)’s arguments, review limitations of the principle and 
discuss the potential applicability outside US context. 
Bell (1980) examines the court case Brown v. Board of Education4, and argues that the 
seminal decision of the court and the recent failure in implementing the court order can be 
explained by “interest convergence” principle, which means “[t]he interest of blacks in achieving 
racial equality will be accommodated only when it converges with the interests of whites.” 
Before the Brown decision, the court supported “separate-but-equal” principle that kept blacks 
in disadvantaged status. Therefore, Bell questions what accounted for the sudden shift in 1954. 
He continues that although some whites may have been motivated by the immorality of racial 
                                                        
4 Brown v. Board of Education was a 1954 US Supreme Court case, which the court decided that racial 
segregation in public schools was unconstitutional. 
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inequality, that could not have been enough to shift court decision. Rather, it was because the 
white policymakers saw economic and political advances at home and abroad that would follow 
the decision. Some of those advances were promoting “immediate credibility for America’s 
struggle with Communist countries” abroad and at home, ease the anger of disillusioned 
American blacks who were facing continuing discrimination and violent attacks in the South. 
Thus, the interest of the whites converged with the interest of the blacks. 
Driver (2011) points to some analytical limitations of interest convergence principle. One 
of such is that the terms “black interests” and “white interests” ignore inter-racial 
disagreements about what their “interests” are. Another is that the principle is irrefutable 
because one can always suggest that the judiciary issues egalitarian decision to promote white 
interests and deny truly egalitarian motivation. This irrefutability leads blacks to conspiratorial 
worldviews that hinders black advancement. 
Albeit these limitations, the interest convergence principle provides us valuable insights 
into the way change occurs. Driver notes that it is crucial not to overlook its considerable 
contributions to legal discourse but cautions that reformers should not take interest 
convergence principle as the “entire arsenal.” 
In this thesis, I will borrow from this idea of interest convergence to uncover how and 
why different actors support and promote migrant domestic workers’ rights. Although it is rare 
to use the term “interest convergence” outside US settings, the idea itself gives us persuasive 
explanation in universal settings. Castagno and Lee (2007) refer to Taylor (1999) and point that 
“the interest convergence principle has its roots in Marxist theory that the that the bourgeoisie 
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will tolerate advances for the proletariat only if those advances benefit the bourgeoisie even 
more.” This indicates that interest convergence has its roots outside the U.S., which suggests 
broader applicability. 
In both Hong Kong and Singapore, there were several examples where interest 
convergence principle could apply. For example, in Hong Kong, the government recently 
strengthened restrictions on the recruitment fees (U.S. Department of State, 2018). Chen, one 
of the leaders of HKCTU, said that the government would implement regulations that benefits 
the migrant domestic workers so long as it does not harm the employers (phone interview, 
2/3/2019). Additionally, 2018 Trafficking in Persons Report recognized this change as one of the 
government’s initiative to challenge human trafficking, which is important for the Hong Kong 
government to maintain international repetition (U.S. Department of State, 2018).  
In Singapore, the implementation of weekly rest day regulations in 2012 has been 
analyzed by several scholars that the advocacy campaigns framed rest days as something 
beneficial to the employers (Koh et al. 2017a). Furthermore, this regulation change was also 
recognized by the U.S. Trafficking in Person Report 2012 as one of the government’s effort to 
prevent human trafficking (U.S. Department of State, 2012). Although more detailed analysis is 
necessary, these examples suggest the applicability of interest convergence principle in Hong 
Kong and Singapore. 
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5. Methods 
During January to March 2019, I interviewed six leaders of migrant domestic workers’ advocacy 
and assistance groups in Hong Kong and three in Singapore. I conducted the interviews by 
phone in English and each interview lasted between thirty to fifty minutes. Subsequently, I 
exchanged text messages and emails to follow-up with some respondents. I initially selected the 
interviewees based on guidance from a few academics who have been working on migrant 
domestic workers and/or social issues in Hong Kong or Singapore, then added some more 
interviewees through the introduction from the interviewees. The profile of six interviewees in 
Hong Kong were: one Filipina domestic worker activist, two Indonesian domestic worker 
activists, one local union leader, one local NGO member and one executive of an employment 
agency. The profile of three interviewees in Singapore were: two local NGO members and one 
researcher. In the interviews, I asked open-ended questions about their strategies and opinions, 
specifically about the live-in rule, the various difficulties migrant workers face, what their 
organizations prioritize in their advocacy work and what activities have been successful. 
The interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed. I also took notes while 
interviewing. I analyzed the transcriptions by comparing answers to a similar question across 
different actors and examining it in relation to their own interests. 
I supplemented my interviews with published reports that focused on the live-in rule and 
official judgment document about the court case, which challenged the lawfulness of live-in 
rule. There were two reports I could find, which are “Live-in policy increases female FDW’s 
vulnerability to various types of abuse” (Mission for Migrant Workers, 2013) and “Pictures from 
the Inside Investigating Living Accommodation of Women Migrant Domestic Workers Towards 
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Advocacy and Action” (Mission for Migrant Workers, 2017). The court case is Lubiano Nancy 
Almorin v. the Director of Immigration (HCAL 210/2016) (HKSAR Court of First Instance. 2018), 
which concluded its first trial in February 14, 2018. These three documents are all from Hong 
Kong; I was not able to find any in Singapore. 
Other than advocacy and assistance groups, I exchanged emails with the Immigration 
Department of HKSAR government and Ministry of Manpower of Singapore government. The 
inquiries were about their purpose of having mandatory live-in policies and the reason for 
changing some immigration regulations at a certain timing. These additional resources were 
used to examine the background of the interviews and situate them in a broader context. 
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6. Analysis 
In this analysis, I will borrow from the idea of “interest convergence” (Bell, 1980) to uncover 
how and why different actors support migrant domestic workers. In Hong Kong, protesting on 
the street is a common strategy for social activists and it is often understood as an aspect that 
shows the “freeness” of Hong Kong. However, in Hong Kong, where electoral democracy is 
incomplete, demonstrations and gatherings are means of political participation to complement 
incomplete democracy (Kurata and Zhang, 2015). Interestingly, migrant workers are allowed to 
participate in this supplementary space. On the contrary, in Singapore, mode of advocacy is 
limited even to the locals, and migrant workers have no place to participate (Piper, 2006). 
This analysis section is written in the following order: first, I discuss why there is a 
demand for live-in domestic workers, second, why, despite this demand, live-in work creates 
tensions between employers and employees and finally what strategies the actors take in 
relation to the live-in rule. Each of the interviewees answered these questions. Answers to the 
first two questions generally matched among respondents but answers to the last question 
varied.  
 
Why demand migrant domestic workers to live-in? 
Hong Kong 
Hong Kong government explains the reasons for requiring domestic workers to live-in in three 
major points. First, they emphasize the need of 24-hour care for certain people (Hong Kong 
Court of First Instance, 2018). Since institutionalized care is unpopular both in Hong Kong and 
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Singapore, live-in domestic worker is a way to mitigate the care burden on family members 
while still taking the form of familial care. Second, Hong Kong government explain that there are 
very few locals who are ready to work as a live-in domestic worker but there are enough who 
want to do live-out domestic work. Therefore, only live-in domestic worker should be brought in 
from abroad (LegCo Panel on Manpower, 2001). Finally, although migrant workers are invited to 
take on live-in domestic work, they should not be a burden to the society. Therefore, they 
should be housed in the employers’ house (Hong Kong Court of First Instance, 2018). 
 
1) Need for 24-hour care 
The government explains that first, live-in condition makes it easier to fulfil certain needs, such 
as taking care of small children, disabled persons and the elderly people.  Employers’ groups 
often claim this need (Backchat, 2/15/2019), and the government supports them (Hong Kong 
Court of First Instance, 2018). In a court case about the constitutionality of live-in requirement, 
Hong Kong immigration department answered that “many employers have special personal care 
needs for which live-in domestic helpers are better placed to cater due to their availability and 
flexibility in providing a variety of services at different hours of the day,” and gives examples by 
saying that “many families need live-in domestic helpers to look after young children, or elderly 
or disabled people who need close attention. The assistance required may be for a short 
duration at any one time (for example, assisting an elderly person’s movement at home at 
nighttime), but the need for such assistance may arise at short notice and at irregular intervals” 
(Hong Kong Court of First Instance, 2018: p.10). 
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Thus, the emphasis of live-in domestic work is on the care work, rather than household 
chores (ibid). But of course, this does not mean that the migrant domestic workers are free 
from household chores. They are expected to both. In this sense, we can understand that the 
migrant domestic workers scheme is part of the government’s care policy. 
Here, I would like to counter this reasoning by differentiating the need for live-in worker 
and 24-hour care. There are other ways to provide 24-hour care without relying on live-in 
workers. Advocates of migrant domestic workers repeatedly claim that this recognition of 
migrant domestic worker as a care worker available 24 hours is problematic, because this 
implies long working hours by default. For example, in Pictures from Inside, a migrant domestic 
worker employed in Hong Kong has reported that, “when the child would vomit in the middle of 
the night, her employer would wake her up to tell her to clean the child and change the 
bedsheet” (Mission for Migrant Workers, 2017). Moreover, on-call must be recognized as 
working hours as well. According to ILO C189 Article 10.3: 
Periods during which domestic workers are not free to dispose of their time as they please and remain 
at the disposal of the household in order to respond to possible calls shall be regarded as hours of 
work to the extent determined by national laws, regulations or collective agreements, or any other 
means consistent with national practice.  
Hence, on-call hours should be regarded as work hours. However, the latter half, “to the 
extent…consistent with national practice,” makes the whole Article hard to enforce, since 
migrant domestic workers typically do not have work hour regulations and are paid a fixed price 
per month, so more working hours do not lead to more pay. Moreover, neither China (for Hong 
Kong) nor Singapore has ratified this convention and therefore enforcing this convention is 
virtually impossible. 
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2) Local domestic workers and migrant domestic workers 
Hong Kong government explain that a live-in domestic worker and a non-live-in domestic 
worker fill different needs. And that there is enough supply of non-live-in domestic workers 
locally, so there is no need to import non-live-in foreign domestic workers. On the contrary, 
there are very few locals who are ready to work as a live-in domestic worker (LegCo Panel on 
Manpower, 2001). Therefore, as a migrant worker, live-in is the only choice. 
In 2003, When the Hong Kong government decided to add live-in rule under Standard 
Contract, securing job for local workers was the official reason for enforcing the rule (ibid). After 
China had adopted opening-up policy in 1978, manufacturing factories in Hong Kong moved 
across the strait to mainland China and many female factory workers lost their jobs (Lim, 2016). 
Directing these former factory workers into domestic work was one of the Hong Kong 
government’s efforts to secure alternative work for these people.  
However, in a report, Mission for Migrant Workers claims that a “study of Caritas in 2002 
showed that all the respondents who were living out of their employer’s homes” were not doing 
additional part time jobs and that  “a few respondents who had part time work,” on their rest 
days were living-in with their employers (Mission for Migrant Workers, 2013: 13). Therefore, 
Hong Kong government needs to verify if forcing migrant workers to live-in would secure jobs 
for local workers. 
Danika5, a Filipina domestic worker activist, recalled that when the Hong Kong 
government announced the application of the rule, people reacted with a “mix of emotions and 
                                                        
5 All of the names in this paper are pseudonyms. 
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opinions”. However, she noted that “because of government misinformation and fear 
mongering, many locals became unfavorable of optional live-out arrangements” (phone 
interview with Danika, 1/31/2019). 
Interviews with other stakeholders support this view. Kari, an employee of a local NGO 
that supports migrant domestic workers understood that the enactment of the live-in rule was 
“due to governmental concerns that domestic workers were moonlighting as sex workers during 
a time when workers were allowed to live-out,” and Chen, a local pro-democracy union leader 
told me that it was because pro-Beijing union insisted that migrant domestic workers take away 
driving jobs from local drivers (phone interview with Kary, 2/27/2019 and with Mr. Chen, 
2/3/2019). 
 
3) Effect of the live-in rule on the society 
The final point Hong Kong government makes is that the live-in condition is not only beneficial 
for the employers, but it is also beneficial for workers and the society. It is beneficial for 
employers primarily because they can have assistance available 24 hours, but also because they 
can more easily monitor their workers.  
Hong Kong Immigration Department further explains that it is beneficial for the society 
because if the migrant domestic workers live out, they will burden the social infrastructure of 
the city. This speaks to local’s feelings, as they have hard time securing housing. The Hong Kong 
government is aware of this and emphasizes social implications to justify the live-in rule. For 
example, In the court case of Lubiano v. the Director of Immigration, the Immigration 
Department explains that, the government has “designed and developed the FDH 
 38 
Scheme…while ensuring that the importation of FDHs would not pose any real demands on 
housing and other social services” (Hong Kong Court of First Instance, 2018: p.11). 
A long-time researcher or migrant domestic workers’ life in Hong Kong told me that 
some migrant workers as well as families of migrant workers think it is safer to live in their 
employers’ house (personal phone interview, 1/9/2019). A politician in Hong Kong explained 
that it is not easy to find a place and even if they could, the living condition would be “really 
bad” (personal phone interview, 1/19/2019). 
Domestic worker activists whom I interviewed, Elsa, Danika and Swity, all emphasized 
that the migrant domestic workers have enabled Hong Kong government to save money by 
providing inexpensive care to their residents. For example, Elsa, an Indonesian domestic worker 
activist says: 
The benefit that the Hong Kong government earns from hiring domestic workers is that the Hong Kong 
family, the middle class especially, are able to hire house assistant or helper to take care of them each 
with very low pay. So, if the Hong Kong family, the middle-income family, do not have anyone in the 
house to help, they would have to hire on their own with their own money. A lot of expenses, for 
example for a babysitter, elderly care, house cleaning, cooking and so on. That is expensive. So, having 
a domestic helper in the house and making it mandatory for us to live in will somehow, create the 
myth of middle-income family. For these services, the Hong Kong government do not need to do 
anything, such as provide elderly care subsidy or any services for their own people.  
(phone interview, 3/17/2019) 
Thus, in their view, migrant domestic workers enable Hong Kong society to maintain “the myth 
of middle-income family” and exempt the government from providing welfare to Hong Kong 
residents. 
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To summarize, Hong Kong government justifies the live-in rule in saying that: 1) there is 
a need for affordable 24-hour care, 2) there are not enough locals who are willing to do live-in 
work with low price and 3) migrant workers can fill this gap by providing inexpensive live-in care 
but while doing so, they should not put pressure on the Hong Kong society. However, migrant 
workers’ activists and advocates are skeptical of these official explanations, and believe there 
are other motivations as well. 
 
Singapore 
The Singapore government’s purpose for the mandatory live-in rule was not clear. In an email 
inquiry to the Ministry of Manpower I asked their purposes of the live-in requirement and an 
officer responded that, “[e]mployers who do not require full-time domestic help, or prefer 
helpers that do not have to stay in with them, can opt for part-time help through companies 
that specialize in housecleaning or care services” (email inquiry with Singapore Ministry of 
Manpower, 4/23/2019). Thus, they did not directly answer the question, yet this response 
suggests that they think there are enough part-time live-out help locally and that there are 
specific needs that can only be filled with full-time live-in help. 
A staff of an NGO, Humanitarian Organization for Migration Economics (HOME), 
suggested that live-in is part of the work permit system that makes employers monitor the 
migrant workers they employ. So, the purpose of the rule is to ensure employers take 
responsibility over migrant workers’ activities (interview with Sophia, 1/25/2019).  
The immigration regulations in Hong Kong and Singapore both have rules that incentivize 
employers to surveil the workers. In Hong Kong, employers must buy medical insurance for their 
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workers and in Singapore, they need both medical insurance and a security bond. These 
requirements force the employers to closely monitor their workers’ actions from fear that they 
might lose their money. 
Additionally, sense of fear is stronger in Singapore because of the gender imbalance of 
migrant population; there are 720,000 non-domestic migrant workers (mostly male workers in 
manual labor) and 250,000 migrant domestic workers (all female) in Singapore (as of 2018) 
(Singapore Ministry of Manpower, 2019). Employers fear their domestic workers would be an 
easy prey of male migrant workers (Constable, 2018).  
 
What is the problem with the live-in rule? 
All the respondents answered to this question in a similar way; live-in condition makes workers 
prone to abuse.  
Hong Kong 
In Hong Kong, Mission for Migrant Workers (2013) explains the consequences of live-in work in 
six facets: live-in condition forces workers to accept 1) not suitable accommodations and 
facilities, 2) inadequate food provisions, 3) no definite work time schedule and duties beyond 
the signed contract, 4) work during rest days and holidays and 5) no safety and privacy. 
Although many of my respondents agreed that live-in greatly exacerbates the working 
condition, none said that live-in is the only cause, or point to any specific condition that is 
caused only by the live-in. It is the combination of rules and customs that cause the abusive 
working condition. Kary, a staff at an NGO in Hong Kong articulates this point as follows: 
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[i]t is difficult to pinpoint one specific cause of exploitation of foreign domestic workers in Hong Kong. 
This is mainly because what we see in our work shows that various causes are actually co-constitutive. 
Many legislative and social factors come together and create circumstances that facilitate such abuse 
and exploitation. 
(answers from Kary, 2/27/2019) 
Since conditions that arise from the live-in rule are so deeply embedded in the whole set 
of regulations that govern the migrant domestic workers, it is difficult to detach the live-in rule 
from other workplace conditions and examine it. This was the main reason why a Filipino 
domestic worker lost the judicial review, Lubiano v. the Director of Immigration, arguing 
whether live-in requirement is unlawful. In the court case, the judge wrote that he is not 
satisfied with the explanation that the risk of abuse rises significantly when living in the 
employer’s home, as follows: 
A domestic helper working in his/her employer’s residence would necessarily be exposed to a risk of ill 
treatment by the employer while working there, regardless of whether he/she also lives in the 
employer’s residence. … While the fact that the FDH is living in the employer’s residence would mean 
that there may be more opportunities for the employer to apply ill treatment on the FDH if the 
employer is minded to do so, I am by no means satisfied that the risk of ill treatment is unacceptably 
or significantly increased by the fact that the FDH is living in the employer’s residence. (Hong Kong 
Court of First Instance, 2018: p.41) 
The judge questions the causal relationship of forced live-in situation and abuse, yet it is hard to 
prove because it is embedded in the multilayered system.  
Chen, a union leader in Hong Kong, also points to the violations of International Labour 
Standard, ILO C189 Article 9 (a), which requires the government to ensure “domestic workers 
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are free to reach agreement with their employer or potential employer on whether to reside in 
the household” (Phone interview with Chen, 2/3/2019). However, neither China, who has the 
authority to ratify international conventions for Hong Kong, nor Singapore has ratified ILO C189. 
Therefore, requiring Hong Kong or Singapore government to comply with ILO C189 is 
ineffective.  
Advocates try to merge their objective with the employers’ interests in order to gain 
more support. For example, Chen said that, “we told the employers that this is all your choice. … 
(because,) now even the employer does not have the choice.” However, this has not been very 
successful so far, because, according to him, “they don’t like the union and cooperating with us 
because there is other issue that they oppose us.” Therefore, for the Hong Kong locals, 
supporting migrant workers or not is more a matter of supporting the pro-democracy union or 
not than the policy itself. Moreover, there is not very much discussion, let alone consensus 
about who will pay the additional cost if the migrant domestic workers were to live out. Most of 
the employers are not willing to take on the cost and are staying away from the whole issue. 
 
Singapore 
In Singapore, a staff of HOME responded that although live-in is not an ideal situation for 
migrant workers, if Singapore was going to make live out an option, it must be a “meaningful 
option” because even if workers were not stipulated by law to live with their employers, if 
security bond was still attached to them, the employers would force the workers to stay (phone 
interview, 1/25/2019). As such, there is disagreement among different actors about how much 
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live-in is adding to the creation of abusive working condition and among NGOs in Singapore, it is 
not considered as significant. 
 
Why do different actors want to change the live-in rule? 
Next, I would like to illustrate, for each organizations and actors, the strategies, perception 
towards changing the live-in rule and their motivations for supporting the migrant domestic 
workers. I borrow from the idea of ‘interest convergence’ (Bell, 1980) to analyze to what extent 
these different actors can support migrant domestic workers, and at which point they refuse to. 
I extend interest convergence and use it to mean, the interest of a marginalized group in 
achieving equality will be accommodated only when it converges with the interest of the 
dominant group. 
In order to investigate the question of why each actor wants to change the live-in rule, I 
asked each interviewee a series of questions such as: if they think changing the live-in rule is 
practical; what they think the major obstacles to changing the live-in rule are; and what 
strategies they are taking.  
 
Hong Kong 
Mandatory live-in rule was added to standard contract in April 2003. Until then, although live-in 
was the norm for migrant domestic workers, it was up to individual choice to live-in or live-out. 
There are still about thirty employers being allowed to employ live-out migrant domestic 
workers because they had been letting their worker live-out before April 2003 and have been 
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continuing to do so (Hong Kong Court of First Instance, 2018: p.15). The policy change has 
criminalized both employees and employers who choose to live-out. 
Since then, migrant domestic worker activists and advocates have constantly demanded 
to reverse the live-in rule. Their major strategies include, rallying on street, educating migrant 
workers about their rights, issuing reports and demanding to the international society, such as 
ILO. In 2014, when Erwiana Sulistyaningsih was found brutally abused by her employer and sent 
back home to Indonesia the social mode to revoke the live-in rule rose. However, the 
movement has not yield policy change. 
 
Danika, Filipina Domestic Worker Activist 
Danika has been working in Hong Kong as a domestic worker for more than twenty years and 
she has been active in organizing migrant workers to improve their working conditions. She 
currently serves as one of the leaders of both United Filipino Hong Kong (UNIFIL-HK) and Asian 
Migrants Coordinating Body (AMCB). 
According to Danika, current priority matters for her organizations are: 1) regulations for 
working hours, 2) decent and proper accommodation and 3) enforcing the law to regulate 
excessive agency fees. As I have discussed above, long working hours and inadequate 
accommodations are two of the common problems that arise from the live-in condition (phone 
interview, 1/31/2019).  
In order to realize these claims, Danika explains that the key to success is the number of 
supporters. With over twenty years of experience as a domestic worker activist in Hong Kong, 
she replies with confidence that: 
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That (the factor of success) is the mass, you know, the presence of, numbers of people who are 
protesting. The support of local groups and international community, and then help from other 
organization and individuals here in Hong Kong.  
Therefore, she and her organization deliberately work to increase the number of supporters. 
She explains her strategies as follows: 
we are not just waiting, we are proactive in, essentially doing it for most of the time. We try to 
maximize every activity, … every time there is an opportunity, we maximize them to raise the issue 
and make press release statement so that we can make (media) stories and help this to become a 
discussion in Hong Kong. 
(phone interview, 1/31/2019) 
They also challenge the live-in rule to make it a choice between the employer and the 
employee. Danika says that, “it’s not easy but we are optimistic.”  
 
Elsa, Indonesian Domestic Worker Activist 
Elsa is an Indonesian domestic worker who is also one of the leaders of International Migrants 
Alliance (IMA). According to their website, IMA is the “first-ever global alliance of organizations 
of grassroots migrants, refugees and displaced peoples,” and was established in 2008 with the 
help from Mission for Migrant Workers, the long-established organization of migrant worker 
activism (Wui and Delias, 2015). It has “more than 120 member organizations from more than 
30 countries.” (IMA website, n.d.) 
Elsa says that they formed the alliance because there was a lack of communication 
between the local and the international arena and explains that: 
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at the local level a lot of us are not very aware of what's happening at the global level. At the global 
level, they don't engage very much with the real migrant, immigrant (or) refugee communities. So, 
this (is) when we see that there are big loopholes in the issues and advocacy. 
But they struggle to advocate for themselves because as she says, “we have to really find a way 
to bring out our voices.” 
Therefore, one of her major motivations of being active is to bring their own voice to the 
center of local and international decision-making process, related to immigration, migration and 
refugee issues. She acknowledges the limitations of grassroot networks, especially regarding 
human resources, language proficiency and finance, however, she sounded most frustrated with 
the limited space they have in regional and international advocacy. She says that: 
It is always very limited to the grassroot because…, whenever it comes to advocacy, usually is 
dominated by NGO, you know, like academia. And it's difficult for us just to go there and register 
ourselves, because you have to pay your own, (like) traffic. You have to cover everything on your own.  
(phone interview, 3/17/2019) 
When asked about her motivation to join the movement, Elsa answered that she was 
also a victim of abuse and therefore her motivations are personal. She says: 
I also had the same problem before, when I came here in 2000. I also had exploitation—underpaid, no 
day off, the agency was cheating me, and my employer was not good. So, I ran away and then I 
learned about my rights. I stayed in the shelter. I learned that we have our basic rights and I realized 
that the agency was cheating, and the government don't care, you know. So that’s how I use my 
knowledge to inform migrants and also to make sure that they do not get the same exploitation like 
me. So that's very personal for me. 
(phone interview, 3/17/2019) 
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In Hong Kong, some shelters that support migrant worker have been providing their 
residents education about their rights and empowering them with skills to organize their own 
coalition. Many of the former residents of the shelter, like Elsa, have become active in claiming 
rights (Wui and Delias, 2015). When migrant workers trained at the shelter move to other 
countries, they often form their coalition in the new destination. Elsa says that in this way, 
migrant worker activists in Hong Kong maybe able to influence migrant workers’ organizing 
efforts in other countries. However, she notes that although they might inspire those in other 
countries to organize, their ability is limited because migrant domestic workers in Hong Kong 
are also “restricted in our condition” and “not easy to travel abroad.” Nevertheless, she says, 
“we work with them in solidarity and I'm sure that domestic workers in other countries are also 
active.” 
When asked about the live-in requirement, she says “that's very tough, okay, that is very 
tough.” At present moment, she does not have a good strategy to push the issue further, as she 
says: 
We do not know yet what kind of strategy might (work for changing) live in, because I think we have 
done everything--from submission to the UN, the ILO, and to the court--, and I think the Hong Kong 
government is very keen on making everyone to live in. So, we have not found yet any other tactic to 
make sure that live out or live in is flexible. 
(phone interview, 3/17/2019) 
 
Swity, Indonesian Domestic Worker Activist 
Swity is an Indonesian domestic worker activist and one of the leaders of both Indonesian 
Migrant Workers Union (IMWU) and Indonesian Migrant Worker Network (JBM). IMWU is a 
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trade union of Indonesian migrant domestic workers, registered in Hong Kong. JBM is an 
Indonesian network of migrant workers and their supporters, founded in 2014 (JBM, n.d.). 
Swity first joined trade union and domestic workers’ organization after running away 
from her first employer. She recalls that: 
I’m also one of the victims; the government didn’t give us right of information to work as migrant 
workers. So, this time I wanted to help workers like me. This is the reason that motivated me. 
(phone interview, 3/10/2019) 
Therefore, Swity also had personal experience of being abused by the employer and running 
away, which motivated her to join. For her, the live-in rule is understood as a form of 
discrimination towards migrant domestic workers. She told the author that: 
The government has not recognized the contribution of the migrant domestic workers to the economy 
in Hong Kong and the society (in Hong Kong). And that’s why the Hong Kong government (has) always 
isolated migrant domestic workers. 
(phone interview, 3/10/2019) 
Therefore, she aspires to change the rule, to make Hong Kong society acknowledge migrant 
domestic workers as persons with equal rights. 
When asked about coalition with the local people, Swity recognized the importance of 
transforming the migrant workers’ claims into local words: 
Usually we have dialogue with them (Hong Kong local people) and rally with them about the condition 
of the Hong Kong workers and how we can support others. And also, like how they can understand 
our situation because we need them also to tell the others our condition, with their language. Because 
in Hong Kong majority speak Cantonese and we are not able to explain very well our condition to the 
local people. 
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(phone interview, 3/10/2019) 
Thus, she emphasizes the importance of local supporters and consciously tries to form allies 
with the local people.  
 
Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions 
Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions (HKCTU) was founded in 1990, now representing 
more than 90 affiliates and 190,000 members in Hong Kong, including domestic service sector 
(HKCTU website). It was first established in 1989 corresponding to Tiananmen crisis, to support 
the democracy movement in mainland China. They had representatives in Legislative Council 
until 2011, however lost their seat since election in 2012. They are one of the two largest trade 
unions in Hong Kong; the other being Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions, a pro-Beijing 
union. 
It is unusual for a trade union to support migrant workers, as migrant workers are 
traditionally seen as competitors to local workers (Eder, 2002). HKCTU says that it supports 
migrant domestic workers because their campaign to improve the Hong Kong working 
conditions would be ineffective if they left the migrant workers out (Wui and Delias, 2015).  
HKCTU uses international power to advance their claims. One of the leaders of HKCTU, 
Chen, uses the United States’ Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report to make their claim heard: 
It is good that the United States puts Hong Kong on the watch list. That would help a bit by 
embarrassing the government. And then help a bit in pushing our case.  
(phone interview, 2/3/2019) 
The United States’ Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report 2018 ranks Hong Kong “Tier 2 
Watch List” and recommends the Hong Kong government to penalize employment agencies that 
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charge excessive fees to migrant domestic workers and to remove the two-week rule. This 
report seems to have had great impact on the Hong Kong government, that they now have a 
working group in the government agency to deal with human trafficking (phone interview, 
2/3/2019). This government agency has been a venue for HKCTU to appeal their claims. As a 
result, law enforcement on agencies that overcharge fees to migrant domestic workers has 
become stricter. As it is reported in the TIP report, “[i]n February 2018, the (Hong Kong) 
government passed legislation that increased the penalties for operating an employment 
agency without a license or overcharging workers to include up to three years imprisonment 
and increase potential fines from no more than 50,000 Hong Kong dollars (HKD) ($6,400) to 
350,000 HKD ($44,790)” (Department of State, 2018). 
However, the two-week rule, which TIP report recommends Hong Kong government to 
remove, has not been lifted yet. According to Chen, “that (monitoring the agencies) is the only 
thing they’re willing to do because that’s also good for the employer. And of course, we also 
lobby for that because that is also good for employee. But anything that the employer must 
provide, it will be very difficult for us to push through.” Chen clearly recognizes the effect and 
limitations of interest convergence. 
HKCTU uses international coalition whenever possible. Chen says that HKCTU interacts 
with the sending countries, primarily through consulates in Hong Kong. He says that the union 
or their affiliates “always go to protest at the consulate” and in addition to that, they also go to 
have dialogues. In the past, Chen says that he has “gone to Indonesia to meet with 
parliamentarian in Indonesia to put hold of the case of Indonesians in Hong Kong.” These 
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strategies indicate the union’s much stronger political and financial power compared to migrant 
domestic workers’ organizations. 
When asked about the live-in rule, Chen referred to the time when there was no live-in 
rule and responded that the rule does not make sense because there was no problem before 
the introduction of the rule: 
When the people were allowed to live out, there was no problem. I mean, it didn’t cause any problem 
in the society. And also, the employer and employee both have the arrangement. Why should we 
require people to live-in? 
(phone interview, 2/3/2019) 
However, he was pessimistic about the prospect of reversing the live-in requirement. The 
political climate in Hong Kong towards pro-democracy groups is becoming antagonistic; the 
influence of Beijing government is ever more significant, and pro-democracy groups are 
gradually losing representation in the Hong Kong Legislative Council. Chen responded that, “I 
think the obstacle is that politically this issue is not favorable to us; the pro-Beijing union, the 
pro-Beijing political party and the pro-establishment political party are all against our demand.” 
HKCTU tries to converge interest with the employers by telling that, “this is all your choice. 
…Now even the employer does not have the choice. So, we are trying to get also the employer 
on our side. But they are no easy, because there is other issue that they are concerned about, 
which they don’t like the union(‘s opinion).” (phone interview, 2/3/2019). Therefore, the 
current political mood is not favorable to the migrant domestic workers. 
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Singapore 
The atmosphere for civil society in Singapore is very different from Hong Kong. NGOs are highly 
regulated and are limited to non-political activities. Migrant workers are not allowed to organize 
their own organizations and their space for political participation is non-existent. When the 
Filipina domestic worker, Flor Contemplacion was executed in 1995, Filipino diaspora 
communities around the globe protested and demanded for justice. Since then, Filipinos have 
acted from outside the nation (Piper, 2005) and migrant workers of other nationalities are 
following suit. 
The local civil society has become more active since the early 2000s (Koh et al. 2016). 
There are currently two major migrant serving NGOs, Transient Workers Count too (TWC2) and 
Humanitarian Organization for Migration Economics (HOME), in Singapore. They also do 
advocacy work by conducting research. They work closely with the government; they hold 
regular meetings with government officials and their demand is communicated in that space; 
and they consult with the ministry before releasing the reports (interview with members of 
HOME, 1/25/2019 and TWC2, 2/1/2019). Hence, the distance between the state and the NGOs 
is much closer compared to that of Hong Kong and conversely, the relationship between 
migrant workers and NGOs is indirect. 
Recent literature show that advocates have framed their objectives in a way so that they 
converge with the majority group’s interests. Koh et al. (2017a) analyze the success of day-off 
campaign in Singapore and illustrate how the campaign gained wide support. The activists 
reframed day-off in words that sympathize with the employers (e.g., domestic workers are also 
employees, just like the employers are in their workplaces so they need a day-off just like you), 
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and resonate with their meritocracy values (e.g., if you give domestic workers a day-off they can 
improve their skills by attending cooking schools). 
Although the two organizations were founded to deal with migrant domestic workers’ 
abuse, their focus seem to be shifting more towards male migrant workers’ issues (interview 
with members of HOME, 1/25/2019 and TWC2, 2/1/2019). The live-in rule of migrant domestic 
workers is not being publicly contested and it is not among priority agendas of the two NGOs. 
 
Transient Workers Count too 
Transient Workers Count too (TWC2) was publicly launched in 2003 to secure better treatment 
for domestic workers. This was a reaction to an incident, where nineteen-year-old Indonesian 
domestic worker, Muawanatul Chasanah, died after months of abuse from her employer in 
2001. A neighbor of the abuser stated that, even if he had known about the abuse, he would not 
have reported it to the police because it is not his business. This kind of apathy of the Singapore 
society provoked concerns and led to the formation of TWC2 (TWC2, n.d.).  The founding chair, 
Braema Mathi, was a Nominated Member of Parliament and a member of Association of 
Women for Action and Research (AWARE), a prominent NGO for women’s rights in Singapore 
(Lyons, 2006). 
One of the major campaigns they initiated was “Day-Off Campaign,” with the goal of 
securing a day-off for all migrant domestic workers. After advocating for almost a decade, the 
law came into force in 2012. The success was a watershed moment for migrant workers and 
their supporters in Singapore, since the country’s migration regulations had not changed in 
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favor of unskilled migrant workers for decades. The factor of success is analyzed in several 
researches (for example, Koh et al. 2017a; Palmary and Gruchy, 2016 and Koh et al. 2016). 
When asked about changing the live-in rule, one of the founders of TWC2, Jim, answered 
in an interview that, “the government would not oppose it in the long term.” However, the 
obstacle was more practical issues, such as do they have enough space to accommodate them 
and who would pay for the additional costs. This is a stark contrast from what my respondents 
in Hong Kong said, as many of them answered that the major obstacle to change the live-in rule 
was political while concerns about space and cost was secondary. According to Jim: 
What they (the government officials) will say is, it's impractical, it will cost money or budgets, “where 
are the workers going to live?” and “would the workers have to pay for accommodation?” for 
example. I think that, what we need to do is think about providing housing where workers can stay. 
They can’t be in the big dormitories, like a lot of male workers stay in because the number of domestic 
workers would be much smaller. Several women sharing a room would probably be practical. 
Providing blockers so that they can have some privacy. I could see it happening. And it may be that if 
Singapore has greater difficulties in recruiting workers to work in Singapore in the future, then we'll 
see more pressure to change position. It's a hard one because, definitely, space costs money in 
Singapore. 
(phone interview, 2/1/2019) 
Another notable difference with Hong Kong is their interaction with government officials 
and their disconnection with migrant domestic workers. As NGOs in Singapore are highly 
regulated by law, building a positive relationship with the government is crucial; not just to 
make their advocacy work effective, but for the organization to survive. Jim says that they 
“meet from time to time with the Ministry of Manpower” as well as contact them through social 
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workers when they are handling a case. The relationship is positive, as he says, “the level of 
communication for individual is very good, I would say. You can't really complain about that.” 
They also share their research with the Ministry of Manpower before releasing it, so that “if 
they get asked by the media a question about the research, they can quickly respond.”  
Yet, the change is slow. For the day-off campaign, it took ten years to change the law. 
And according to Jim, what pushed the government in the end was “criticism from various 
directions,” including from overseas as well as gaining “public support” locally. Jim says that, 
“sometimes when you are doing it, it makes you feel that it won't make any progress. And I 
think when people take an issue for life, they really have to be in it and work for years and 
years” (phone interview, 2/1/2019). 
 
Humanitarian Organization of Migration Economics 
Humanitarian Organization for Migration Economics (HOME) was founded in 2004 and provides 
assistance to migrant workers, advocate on behalf and empower them through educational and 
vocational training programs (HOME, n.d.). The founder, Bridget Tan is a former chair of 
Archdiocesan Commission for the Pastoral Care of Migrants and Itinerant People (ACMI), which 
is religious NGO dealing with migrant workers’ issues (Lyons, 2006).  
In a report “Home sweet home? Work, life and well-being of foreign domestic workers in 
Singapore” issued in 2015, HOME recommend the government to “provide live-out options for 
domestic workers” because “live-in domestic workers on average work far more hours than 
almost any category of workers,” they are expected to be “available around the clock,” the live-
in condition “isolates the worker” and  makes them “vulnerable to illegal confinement, physical 
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and sexual abuse” (HOME, 2015). However, after this report, their emphasis has shifted from 
well-being of migrant domestic workers to issues of human trafficking. Their most recent report, 
“Behind Closed Doors: Forced Labour in the Domestic Work Sector in Singapore,” has 14 
recommendations to the government, but do not include optional live-out in their list (HOME 
and Liberty Shared, 2019).  
During a phone interview, Sophia, a research representative of HOME indicated that it 
would be costly for the workers to live-out, although live-in is “clearly not an ideal situation for 
the employee.” Moreover, it would not be “a meaningful option” if other conditions were left 
the same. In other words, if the government regulations that make employers “supervise and 
control the workers,” such as security bond, were unchanged, optional live-out would be 
meaningless. Additionally, she posed concerns over where to accommodate the 250 thousand 
migrant domestic workers (interview memo, 1/24/2019). Thus, HOME currently do not actively 
promote optional live-out as it does not match with their anti-human trafficking agenda. 
 
  
 57 
7. Conclusion 
In this thesis, I interviewed nine key actors among migrant domestic worker activists and 
supporters in Hong Kong and Singapore. Using the live-in rule as a focal point, I examined why 
some actors acted to abolish the live-in rule. In the course of researching this question, I also 
explored the purpose of this rule and the effect it has.  
In Hong Kong, the purpose of the live-in rule was clearly shown by the government in 
three points: 1) providing round-the-clock care for Hong Kong residents and 2) providing jobs 
for local women while 3) avoiding any pressure on the city’s infrastructure (HKSAR Court of First 
Instance. 2018). As a result, the city’s responsibility to provide care for their residents is pushed 
into the sphere of private homes, while simultaneously making the labour of migrant domestic 
workers invisible.  
Migrant domestic worker activists demand recognition for their contribution to the Hong 
Kong society and call for the end of discriminatory regulations (phone interview with Danika 
1/31/2019; with Swity, 3/10/2019; with Elsa 3/17/2019). They claim that live-in and live-out 
must be decided upon by the mutual agreement of the employer and the employee. If realized, 
this policy would benefit migrant domestic workers who can choose. However, given the 
uneven relationship between the employer and the migrant domestic worker, free choice may 
be difficult, and for those migrant domestic workers who have unequal relationships with the 
employer, the option may not be meaningful. To prevent abuse of those migrant workers, the 
activists call for rest-hour and tangible accommodation regulations. 
In Singapore, the government does not clearly state the purpose of the live-in rule, 
forcing civil society to “second-guess” (Lyons, 2006) the government’s intentions. A member of 
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the NGO, HOME, suggested that the live-in rule is there to make sure employers watch over 
migrants workers (phone interview, 1/25/2019). In any case, the consequence of the live-in 
work replicates the situation of Hong Kong: long working hours, isolation, a lack of security and 
an increased risk of abuse (HOME, 2015). 
In Singapore, unlike Hong Kong, neither TWC2 nor HOME, the two most vocal NGOs 
supporting migrant workers, is calling for a reversal of the live-in rule. These NGOs are hesitant 
to propose it because of the additional cost the policy would incur. Their closeness to the 
government has significant implications, as advocates in Hong Kong do not propose alternative 
policies when protesting certain policies, while advocates in Singapore are concerned about 
what the government officials would have to do.    
In Hong Kong, migrant domestic workers’ activists’ interests and HKCTU’s interests have 
converged. HKCTU’s identity as pro-democracy union has made them help the migrant domestic 
workers form a union and act jointly with them. However, HKCTU has lost its political power 
ever since the return of Hong Kong to China and currently, they have no representation in the 
Legislative Council. As influence from the Beijing government increase, pro-democratic political 
parties are losing their place in Hong Kong. Therefore, HKCTU and the policymakers’ interests 
are unlikely to converge, any time soon. 
In Singapore, migrant domestic workers cannot participate in public protest, therefore 
their interests are mostly unheard. Under Singapore’s stringent regulations on the civil society, 
the NGOs work as mediators between the workers, the employers and the government, rather 
than migrant workers’ advocate. The NGO’s interests let alone migrant domestic workers’ 
interests are hidden and hard to detect. However, in both Hong Kong and Singapore, the 
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government is keen to improve their international image, particularly the ranking on Trafficking 
in Persons Report. Therefore, human trafficking has become the main venue for promoting 
migrant domestic workers’ rights.  
The live-in rule makes workers dependent on employers for their survival. The 
community they live is often an important entry point to the society. If the worker is not 
counted as a member of that community, the worker is vulnerable. The live-in rule 
systematically creates a vulnerable population among their community. Thus, the live-in rule is 
central to the discriminatory system that leads to abuse. 
 
  
 60 
Appendix 
• Figure 4. Total Fertility Rate (1981-2017) 
 
(Source: HKSAR Census and Statistics Department 
https://www.censtatd.gov.hk/hkstat/sub/sp160.jsp?productCode=FA100090 and  
Singapore Department of Statistics https://www.singstat.gov.sg/find-data/search-by-theme/population/births-and-
fertility/latest-data) 
 
• Figure 5. Female Labour Participation Rate (age 25-64) 
 
(Source: HKSAR Census and Statistics Department 
https://www.censtatd.gov.hk/hkstat/sub/sp140.jsp?productCode=B1010003  and  
Singapore Ministry of Manpower https://stats.mom.gov.sg/Pages/EmploymentTimeSeries.aspx) 
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• Table 3. Basic information of the two cities 
 Hong Kong Singapore 
Area 429 square foot 279 square foot 
Population 7.4 million 5.6 million 
Density 17,552/ square foot 20,212/ square foot 
Major 
Language 
Standard Chinese 
English 
Cantonese 
English 
Malay 
Chinese 
Tamil 
Ethnicity Han Chinese      92% 
Filipino               2.5% 
Indonesians      2.1% 
White                 0.8% 
Other                 2.6% 
Han Chinese      74% 
Malay                  13% 
Indian                    9% 
Other                     3% 
Government Devolved executive-led system 
with a socialist republic 
Unitary dominant-party 
parliamentary constitutional 
republic 
   
  
 62 
References 
Adelyn Lim. 2016. Transnational Organising and Feminist Politics of Difference and Solidarity: 
The Mobilisation of Domestic Workers in Hong Kong. Asian Studies Review, 40:1, 70-88, 
DOI: 10.1080/10357823.2015.1124841 
Backchat. 2/15/2019. “Working conditions for domestic helpers.” Accessed May 30, 2019. 
https://www.rthk.hk/radio/radio3/programme/backchat/episode/554844. 
Bell D. 1980. Brown v. Board of Education and the interest-convergence dilemma. Harvard 
Law Review, pp.518-533. 
Bell D. 1987. And we will not be saved: the elusive quest for racial justice. New York, Basic 
Books. 
Castagno, A.E. and Lee, S.J., 2007. Native mascots and ethnic fraud in higher education: Using 
tribal critical race theory and the interest convergence principle as an analytic tool. Equity 
& Excellence in Education, 40(1), pp.3-13. 
Chiu Yee Koh, Charmian Goh, Kellynn Wee and Brenda S.A. Yeoh. 2016. The Dynamics of 
Policy Formulation and Implementation: A Case Study of Singapore’s Mandatory Weekly 
Day off Policy for Migrant Domestic Workers. Migrating out of Poverty; working paper 36. 
Constable, N. 2018. Tales of Two Cities: Legislating Pregnancy and Marriage Among Foreign 
Domestic Workers in Singapore and Hong Kong. 
Constable, N., 2009. Migrant workers and the many states of protest in Hong Kong. Critical 
Asian Studies, 41(1), pp.143-164. 
 63 
Constable, N., 2010. Telling tales of migrant workers in Hong Kong: transformations of faith, 
life scripts, and activism. The Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology, 11(3-4), pp.311-329. 
Department of State, United States of America. June 2018. Trafficking in Persons Report. 
Driver, J., 2011. Rethinking the interest-convergence thesis. Nw. UL Rev., 105, p.149. 
Eder, Mine. 2002. “The Constraints on Labour Internationalism: Contradictions and 
Prospects.”In Global Unions: Theory and Strategies of Organized Labour in the Global 
Political Economy, edited by J. Harrod and R. O’Brien, 167–185. New York: Routledge. 
Fish, J.N. and Shumpert, M., 2017. The Grassroots-Global Dialectic: International Policy as an 
Anchor for Domestic Worker Organizing. In Gender, Migration, and the Work of Care (pp. 
217-244). Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. 
Gibson, K., Law, L. and McKay, D., 2001. Beyond heroes and victims: Filipina contract migrants, 
economic activism and class transformations. International Feminist Journal of 
Politics, 3(3), pp.365-386. 
Goh, C., Wee, K. and Yeoh, B.S., 2017. Migration governance and the migration industry in 
Asia: moving domestic workers from Indonesia to Singapore. International Relations of the 
Asia-Pacific, 17(3), pp.401-433. 
Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions, September 26, 2018. “About HKCTU.” 
http://en.hkctu.org.hk/content/about-hkctu. 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Court of First Instance. 2018. Lubiano Nancy Almorin 
v. The Director of Immigration. (HCAL 210/2016) 
 
Hsia, H.C., 2009. The making of a transnational grassroots migrant movement: A case study of 
Hong Kong's Asian Migrants’ Coordinating Body. Critical Asian Studies, 41(1), pp.113-141. 
 
 64 
Humanitarian Organization for Migration Economics (HOME). n.d. “what we do” Accessed 
May 13, 2019.  https://www.home.org.sg/what-we-do-index 
Humanitarian Organization for Migration Economics (HOME). 2015. “Work, Life and Well-
Being of Foreign Domestic Workers in Singapore.” 
Humanitarian Organization for Migration Economics (HOME) and Liberty Shared. 2019. 
“Behind Closed Doors: Forced Labour in the Domestic Work Sector in Singapore.” 
 
Indonesian Migrant Worker Network (JBM). n.d. “Policy Advocacy: Protection for Indonesian 
Migrant Workers.” Retrieved from 
http://jaringan.buruhmigran.or.id/media/profile_jbm_en.pdf 
International Migrants Alliance (IMA). May 17, 2013. “About IMA.” (blog) 
https://wearemigrants.net/about/. 
International Migrants Alliance (IMA). n.d. Accessed May 6, 2019. 
https://wearemigrants.net/about/ 
Koh, A. 2005. Imagining the Singapore “Nation” and “Identity”: The role of the media and 
National Education. Asia Pacific Journal of Education, 25(1), pp.75-91. 
Koh, C.Y., Goh, C., Wee, K. and Yeoh, B.S., 2016. The Dynamics of Policy Formulation and 
Implementation: A Case Study of Singapore’s Mandatory Weekly Day off Policy for Migrant 
Domestic Workers. Working paper 36. Migrating out of Poverty RPC Working Paper. 
Singapore: Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore. 
http://migratingoutofpoverty. dfid. gov. uk/files/file. php. 
 65 
Koh, C.Y., Goh, C., Wee, K. and Yeoh, B.S., 2017b. Drivers of migration policy reform: The day 
off policy for migrant domestic workers in Singapore. Global Social Policy, 17(2), pp.188-
205. 
Koh, C.Y., Wee, K., Goh, C. and Yeoh, B.S., 2017a. Cultural mediation through 
vernacularization: framing rights claims through the day-off campaign for migrant 
domestic workers in Singapore. International Migration, 55(3), pp.89-104. 
Koh, Chiu Yee; Goh, Charmian; Wee, Kellynn and Yeoh, Brenda S.A. 2016. The Dynamics of 
Policy Formulation and Implementation: A Case Study of Singapore’s Mandatory Weekly 
Day off Policy for Migrant Domestic Workers. 
Koh, Wee, Goh and Yeoh. 2017. Cultural Mediation Through Vernacularization: Framing rights 
claims through the day-off campaign for migrant domestic workers in Singapore. 
Kurata, Toru and Zhang, Ikuman. 2015. Hong Kong: A City of Freedom Confronting China. 
Iwanami Shinsho. (in Japanese) 
Lai, M.Y., 2010, September. Dancing to different tunes: Performance and activism among 
migrant domestic workers in Hong Kong. In Women's Studies International Forum (Vol. 33, 
No. 5, pp. 501-511). Pergamon. 
LegCo. 2001.  Panel on Manpower: Promotion of Job Opportunities for Local Domestic 
Helpers. LC Paper No. CB (2)189/01-02(04). 
Lyons, L., 2004. Organizing for domestic worker rights in Singapore: The limits of 
transnationalism. 
 66 
Lyons, L., 2005. Transient Workers Count Too?: The Intersection of Citizenship and Gender in 
Singapore's Civil Society. Sojourn: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia, 20(2), pp.208-
248. 
Lyons, L., 2006. The limits of transnational activism: organizing for migrant workers’ rights in 
Malaysia and Singapore. In Transnationalization of Solidarities and Women Movements 
Workshop. University of Montreal. 
Lyons, L., 2009. Transcending the border: Transnational imperatives in Singapore's migrant 
worker rights movement. Critical Asian Studies, 41(1), pp.89-112. 
Ma. Glenda Lopez Wui & Dina Delias. 2015. Examining the struggles for domestic workers: 
Hong Kong and the Philippines as interacting sites of activism, Philippine Political Science 
Journal, 36:2, 190-208, DOI: 10.1080/01154451.2015.1085677 
Marti, G., 2019. The effects of multilevel governance on the rights of migrant domestic 
workers in Singapore. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 45(8), pp.1345-1360. 
Mission for Migrant Workers. 2013. Live-In Policy: increases female FDW’s vulnerability to 
various types of abuse. 
Mission for Migrant Workers. 2017. Pictures from the Inside Investigating Living 
Accommodation of Women Migrant Domestic Workers Towards Advocacy and Action. 
https://issuu.com/migrantshk/docs/pictures_from_the_inside_a4 
Nakonz, J. and Shik, A.W.Y., 2009. And all your problems are gone: Religious coping strategies 
among Philippine migrant workers in Hong Kong. Mental Health, Religion & Culture, 12(1), 
pp.25-38. 
 67 
Palmary, I. and De Gruchy, T. 2016. How unpopular policies are made: Policy making for 
migrant women in South Africa, Bangladesh and Singapore. Migrating out of Poverty; 
working paper 45. 
Palmer, W., 2013. Public–private partnerships in the administration and control of Indonesian 
temporary migrant labour in Hong Kong. Political Geography, 34, pp.1-9. 
Piper, N. 2006. Migrant worker activism in Singapore and Malaysia: Freedom of association 
and the role of the state. Asian and Pacific Migration Journal, 15(3), pp.359-380. 
Piper, N. 2005. Migrant labor in Southeast Asia; country study: Singapore. Friedrich Ebert 
Stiftung (FES) Project on Migrant Labor in Southeast Asia. Retrieved 29 March 2016, from 
http://www.fes.de/aktuell/focus_interkulturelles/focus_1/documents/8_000.pdf 
Rother, S., 2017. Indonesian migrant domestic workers in transnational political spaces: 
Agency, gender roles and social class formation. Journal of Ethnic and Migration 
Studies, 43(6), pp.956-973. 
Singapore Ministry of Manpower. n.d. (accessed June 12, 2019). Foreign workforce numbers. 
https://www.mom.gov.sg/documents-and-publications/foreign-workforce-numbers 
Taylor, E. 1999. Critical race theory and interest convergence in the desegregation of higher 
education. In L. Parker, D. Deyhle, & S. Villenas (Eds.), Race is . . . race isn’t: Critical race 
theory and qualitative studies in education (pp. 182-201). Boulder, CO: Westview. 
Transient Workers Count Too. n.d. “Organisation.” Accessed May 13, 2019. 
http://twc2.org.sg/who-we-are/organisation/. 
United States Department of State. 2012. 2012 Trafficking in Persons Report. https://2009-
2017.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2012/index.htm 
 68 
United States Department of State. 2018. 2018 Trafficking in Persons Report. 
https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-trafficking-in-persons-report/ 
Wui, Glenda Lopez and Delias, Dina. 2015. Examining the struggles for domestic workers: 
Hong Kong and Philippines as interacting sites of activism. 
Yea, S., 2018. Helping from home: Singaporean youth volunteers with migrant-rights and 
human-trafficking NGO s in Singapore. The Geographical Journal, 184(2), pp.169-178. 
Yeoh, B.S. and Annadhurai, K., 2008. Civil society action and the creation of “transformative” 
spaces for migrant domestic workers in Singapore. Women's Studies, 37(5), pp.548-569. 
 
